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Published in Crop Sci. 44:1113-1120 (2004).
© 2004 Crop Science Society of America
677 S. Segoe Rd., Madison, WI 53711 USA

PERSPECTIVES

Balancing Investment Incentives and Social Benefits when Protecting Plant Varieties

Implementing Initial Variety Systems

W. Lessera and M. A. Mutschlerb,*

a Department of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853
b Department of Plant Breeding, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853

* Corresponding author (mam13{at}cornell.edu).

This paper examines the most recent (1991) UPOV modification of Plant Variety Protection systems to provide incentives for prebreeding. We conclude the system is unworkable as presently interpreted and, at a minimum, recommend that national bodies be established to manage minimum enhancements for initial variety status. A more fundamental limitation is the application of a single approach for improvements controlled by single or by multiple gene traits; a relatedness requirement is appropriate for the latter but not the former. We recommend different criteria be applied depending on the type(s) of innovation that characterizes a new variety. Absent that, the incentive structure applies pressure against the use of competitors' materials in a breeding program, which can delay breeding advances, while not providing significant incentives to encourage introduction of new traits through prebreeding.


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Crop Science 2004 44: 1109-1112. [Full Text]  



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